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SLIM JUST LEFT TOWN: DECISIONMAKING
ON AN INTENSIVE CARE UNIT
Dena S. Davis*
The title of this paper comes from an incident that occurred while I
was participating in morning rounds on the pediatric and surgical
intensive care unit of a large, midwest tertiary care center. The pa-
tient under discussion was an eight-week-old girl who had been
born without kidneys, and who had been cared for on the unit for
seven weeks. In the previous week, the baby's condition had gone
steadily downhill, as she experienced one medical catastrophe after
another. One of the nurses asked the staff doctor who was leading
rounds that morning, "'What are the baby's chances?" The physi-
cian replied, "Her chances are slim." To which one of the young
residents immediately answered, "'Slim just left town."
T HIS essay will analyze the process of making health care decisions
when patients' chances are slim. I look at recent legal tools that
purport to enhance patients' control over their own care, and conclude
that they are rarely efficacious. Because all medical decisions are based
on prognosis, and because prognosis is ineluctably subjective, the doc-
tor retains almost total control of the decisionmaking process.
I. RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM OF OVERTREATMENT
A great deal of energy in medicine, law, and ethics has been de-
voted to the choices that face us when "Slim leaves town." Before
World War II, there were fewer dilemmas because medicine had fewer
interventions to offer. After the war, as the "wonders of modem
medicine" exploded into a society ill-prepared to deal with the resulting
social ramifications, the paradigmatic dilemma involved allocating a
scarce medical resource among a competing number of needy patients.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. I am grateful for the sup-
port of the Cleveland Clinic Foundation, where I was a Fellow in Bioethics in 1989. Rebecca
Dresser, James Orlowski, and Jacquelyn Slomka were generous and patient in answering questions
and reading drafts; their contributions did much to strengthen this essay.
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Perhaps the classic example of an allocation dilemma is that of kidney
dialysis: when it first became possible, there were many more candi-
dates than machines. Hospitals had the hard task of deciding which
candidates would be accepted; ethicists had a field day discussing their
decisions. Today the dilemma of scarcity remains with us, but it has
been joined by an equally thorny problem: a culture of medicine that
does not know when to stop. Now that dialysis machines are ubiqui-
tous, the problem is not the patient who needs treatment and cannot
get it, but the patient who cannot benefit from treatment and gets it
anyway.
Overtreatment that merely serves to extend the dying process is an
ethical problem from three perspectives. The principle of beneficence is
abrogated when a patient is subjected to burdensome procedures that
have scant hope of a good outcome. The principle of distributive justice
is at issue when scarce and expensive resources are spent upon patients
whom these resources are unlikely to help. The principle of respect for
autonomy is threatened when patients become the objects of medical
care that they or their agents have attempted to reject (or when pa-
tients and their agents have been left out of the decisionmaking process
altogether).
At least since the Quinlan case," the problem of overtreatment has
increasingly become a focus of legal attention. Patients, their agents,
and hospital administrators have faced off in court over the issue of
withdrawing unwanted treatment. Groups such as the Hemlock Society
and the Society for the Right to Die have been organized, offering sup-
port for those who wish to retain control over the manner of their dy-
ing. In a recent case in Chicago, the father of a young boy who had
been kept alive in a comatose state for eight months after a tragic acci-
dent, marched into the hospital room, kept medical personnel at bay
with a gun, and unplugged his son from his life support systems. A
grand jury refused to indict.2
One tenet on which all observers agree is that courts are not the
best arena for deciding these cases. Perhaps society needs paradigmatic
cases like Quinlan to create landmarks; the large number of these
cases, however, and the necessity to decide them quickly, require that
they normally be resolved between the doctor, patient, and family,
without constant resort to the courts.
1. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
2. N.Y. Times, May 7, 1989, at 26, col. 5.
[Vol. 23:261
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The responses to the problem of overtreatment constitute a patch-
work of policy, legislation, and case law. Three approaches that at-
tempt to deal with the problem proactively are: various forms of ad-
vance directives or so-called "Living Wills," durable powers of
attorney, and hospitals' do not resuscitate (DNR) policies. In one way
or another, supporters of each of these approaches claim that these ap-
proaches will empower patients and their agents to regain control over
life-and-death decisions.
"Living Wills," in which a person makes a statement about when
he or she would want certain kinds of treatment withdrawn, have cap-
tured the imagination of many people. "Dear Abby" reports tens of
thousands of requests for living wills each time she deals with the sub-
ject.3 The New York group, Concern for Dying, has distributed mil-
lions of them.4 In 1976, California became the first state to recognize
statutorily the existence of such documents in its "Natural Death Act";
many states have followed suit.5 But California's experience suggests
that these documents are more helpful in sparking discussion between
family members and physicians than in actually directing withdrawal
of specific treatment.6 Even when the document is signed (or updated)
after the person received a terminal diagnosis, the document cannot
help but remain vague. Thus, living wills have been criticized as re-
turning too much discretion to the physician.7 The President's Commis-
sion for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research agreed with this assessment, noting that
a decision not to follow an advanced directive may sometimes
be justified even when it would not be acceptable to disregard
a competent patient's contemporaneous choice. Such a deci-
sion would most often rest on a finding that the patient did not
adequately envision and consider the particular situation
within which the actual medical decision must be made.'
For this reason, the Commission concluded that "[d]urable powers of
3. PRESIDENT'S COM=ISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBI.ES IN MEDICNE AND Bi-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAvIoRAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREA~TbIEr 140
(1983) [hereinafter DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATiENT].
4. Id. at 139.
5. Id. at 137.
6. Id. at 145 & n.73.
7. K. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION: OUR LAST QUEST FOR RE-
sPoNSIBILITY 176-84 (1976).
8. DECIDING TO FoREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 3, at 137.
1991]
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attorney are preferable to 'living wills' since they are more generally
applicable and provide a better vehicle for patients to exercise self-
determination, though experience with both is limited."9
In a durable power of attorney, a person designates an agent
(often, but not necessarily, a family member), who is legally empow-
ered to act for her.10 The advantages over a "living will" are obvious:
the agent is "on the spot," making contemporaneous decisions, able to
modify those decisions as new medical information becomes available.
Reacting to a legal and social climate in which end-of-life
decisions have moved into the spotlight, many hospitals have enacted
in-house DNR policies. Until recently, physicians were often reluctant
to enter an explicit "no-code" order on a patient's chart;"1 instead, they
resorted to a system of colored dots decipherable only by hospital staff,
or to verbal instructions to nurses to "walk slowly" if a certain patient
was in arrest. Even worse was the designation of "show code," in which
a sham attempt at resuscitation was conducted for the benefit of the
family. But as courts have upheld the appropriateness of withholding
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) from some patients, physicians
have grown more comfortable with entering a "no-code" on a chart12
Unfortunately, recent studies have shown that patients and families are
often not consulted or told that a no-code order has been entered. For
example, a 1985 study found that of seventy-one patients who were
designated DNR, written justification was given for only forty-one.13 In
only fifteen per cent the of cases were patient wishes given as a reason
for DNR.1 4
II. CASE STUDIES OF HOSPITAL DECISiONMAKING
These approaches are largely cosmetic. Patients and their families,
sometimes even doctors, nurses, and hospital ethicists, may believe that
these tools restore decisionmaking to the patient, but in fact they
9. Id. at 5.
10. The term "durable" refers to the fact that the usual power of attorney is for a discrete
transaction such as selling a house and ceases automatically if the principal becomes incapaci-
tated. See G. ALEXANDER, WRITING A LIVING WILL 49-50 (1988).
11. Emergency "codes" define the procedures followed by hospital personnel under various
circumstances. "Code Blue," for example, might signal that a patient had stopped breathing, al-
lowing immediate response by hospital staff without alarming other patients and visitors.
12. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFcI OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. LIFE-SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES
AND THE ELDERLY, OTA-BA-306, at 183-84 (1987).
13. Youngner, Lewandoski, McClish, Suknialis, Coulton & Bartlett, Do Not Resuscitate Or-
ders-Incidence and Implications in a Medical Intensive Care Unit, 253 J. A.M.A. 54, 54 (1985),
14. Id.
[Vol. 23:261
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merely constitute a new set of rituals, token sacrifices at the paper altar
of patient autonomy. Power remains firmly in the hands of the physi-
cian, although the physician herself may be so mesmerized by chanting
the mantra of "informed consent" that she fails to realize this.
To illustrate my argument, let me present the following four true
cases (with names and identifiers changed), based on my experience as
a Fellow in Bioethics in a large, tertiary care center.
A. Anthony Cooper
Mr. Cooper was a seventy-three-year-old white male, who had
spent five weeks in the intensive care unit (ICU) following cardiac sur-
gery. His problems included "cold leg," (implying some circulatory
failure) and decreasing liver, kidney, and respiratory function. He had
not been conscious for some time. The staff physician in charge of the
ICU wrote the following note in Mr. Cooper's chart:
Long discussion with patient's wife and son. They were very
explicit that, based on patient's statement and attitudes in the
past, he would not want to be maintained in this condition.
They ask we withdraw all active therapy, and just keep him
comfortable. Although this is earlier in the course of a fatal
illness than we would normally take these measures, I think
we should agree with their wishes based on the ethical princi-
pal of autonomy. Statistically, there is very little chance of
recovery from respiratory, hepatic, and renal failure after five
weeks in an ICU.
The following day, the physician ordered that Mr. Cooper be taken off
TPN (total parenteral nutrition, delivered through an intravenous line).
Although the patient continued to be intubated and on a respirator, the
machine was turned to room air; no extra oxygen was provided. Mr.
Cooper died peacefully the next day.
B. Nikki Galvanis
Nikki was a six-week-old Greek child from a family of recent im-
migrants. Only his father spoke English with any fluency. Nikki had
been born in a community hospital, where he had initially been
healthy, but he began to have severe seizures on his third day of life.
Medical management of these seizures was unsuccessful. After four
weeks during which there was no improvement, the baby was trans-
ferred to a tertiary care center for a magnetic resonance imaging
1991]
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(MRI). 5 Three days after his transfer, he was intubated and placed on
a ventilator. He had a poor sucking reflex, and was receiving nutrition
and hydration by means of a nasogastric tube.
A meeting of the hospital ethics committee was called because
Nikki's parents had indicated that they did not want to continue ag-
gressive treatment if there was no chance that their son would ever
breathe on his own. At the community hospital where Nikki had been
born there had been an understanding between the family and the staff
that if there were no hope of the baby's recovery, they would take the
baby home and keep him comfortable for his remaining days. His
transfer to the tertiary care center, accompanied by a number of com-
munication gaps between the two hospitals and exacerbated by the
family's poor grasp of English, had resulted in an aggressive level of
care for Nikki that the parents had never wanted.
In the opinion of Nikki's primary physician, a pediatric neurolo-
gist, Nikki was suffering from a rare disorder known as myoclonic en-
cephalopathy. All the babies cited in the medical literature concerning
this disorder had died before their first birthday, most considerably
sooner. The physician explained that his confidence in this diagnosis
was only about ninety-five percent sure, but that his prognosis of death
in infancy was completely certain.
Nikki's parents were invited in. They explained, through the father
and a translator, that they wanted their baby to live, but not "if he
can't breathe on his own." The committee, without dissent, agreed that
there was strong ethical support to remove Nikki from his various tubes
and lines so that his mother could hold him without impediment. The
family understood that Nikki might die immediately, or that he might
be able to go home with them and survive for weeks or even months.
The next day, the hospital chaplain's office found a Greek priest who
came in and prayed with the family in Nikki's room. A resident re-
moved Nikki's respiratory tube and placed the baby in his mother's lap.
Nikki died immediately.
C. Deborah Cook
Deborah arrived at the tertiary care center at one week of age. At
the community hospital where she was born, she had been diagnosed as
having no kidneys. The cause was unknown. She vomited anything she
15. MRI scans generate medically diagnostic images, similar in nature to a CAT scan, but
using magnetic fields rather than X-rays. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1226 (16th
ed. 1989).
[Vol. 23:261
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ate or drank, and it was assumed that she had some kind of intestinal
blockage. She also could not breathe without the aid of a ventilator.
When the community hospital first called the tertiary care center, seek-
ing to transfer the baby to the care of its pediatric nephrologist, the
latter responded that he would not take the baby if she were not
breathing on her own; he did not think that the odds justified trying to
treat a newborn with failure of two systems. The community hospital
managed to extubate Deborah, who breathed independently for a few
days, allowing the nephrologist to accept her for admission. Deborah
was then intubated "temporarily" for a minor procedure, but all subse-
quent efforts to wean her from the ventilator proved futile.
Deborah's entrance into the unit was heralded with tension and
conflict; many of the personnel-staff, residents, and nurses-felt that
this was a futile endeavor that would only cause suffering for everyone.
There were frequent emotional references to another newborn who had
been on the unit for nearly a year before finally dying, a traumatic
experience no one wished to repeat. Senior staff physicians felt discour-
aged and frustrated at Deborah's lack of progress, but were unwilling
to challenge the optimism of the primary physician. Nurses were angry
at the senior staff for not "standing up" to the primary physician.
There was much disagreement, never fully aired, about the adequacy of
the measures taken to control the baby's pain.
Deborah's primary nurse called a "team consult" after two weeks,
ostensibly as a routine move with a long-term patient but, in fact, to try
to resolve some of these conflicts. At the meeting, the pediatric
nephrologist reiterated his plan for Deborah: to continue to dialyze by
means of continuous peritoneal dialysis (CPD); to support nutritionally
through TPN; and to try to wean her from the ventilator, all in the
hope of achieving a weight of ten pounds, the minimum at which a
kidney transplant could be contemplated. Based on the experience of
two medical centers with a total of twenty babies, he estimated her
chances of getting to transplant at seventy percent, and her chances of
a successful transplant at eighty percent. Despite the fact that nurses,
residents, and senior staff had been muttering that these were wildly
optimistic projections, no one challenged the nephrologist.10
The social worker and Deborah's primary nurse reported on the
family situation. Deborah's mother had two children by a previous
16. In later discussions with ICU personnel, it became obvious that the nephrologist had not
convinced anyone; for example, one nurse mentioned a competing statistic to me, which showed
that only eight per cent of infants on CPD survive their first year.
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marriage; her father was a salesman and out-of-town for long periods.
They were committed to Deborah, came to visit as often as their diffi-
cult circumstances allowed, and were thinking ahead to the rigors in-
volved in doing CPD at home. The family was described as living from
crisis to crisis but managing always to survive. Their attitude toward
Deborah was that as long as there was hope, they wanted everything
done.
During the two long months of Deborah's life, the family's attitude
was consistently presented as the main ethical defense for continuing
treatment. When I spoke privately with the pediatric nephrologist, he
related that when he had first examined Deborah, he had explained to
the parents that the choice whether or not to treat aggressively was
theirs, that he would be very supportive if they decided to move the
baby to a regular nursing floor and give her comfort measures until she
died. During rounds, as nurses and others asked, "Why are we doing
this?" the answer was always, "The parents want to treat."
Eventually, Deborah's problems overwhelmed her. She developed a
strangulated hernia. Abdominal surgery made it impossible to continue
with CPD; dialysis was achieved temporarily with slow continuous ul-
tra-filtration (SCUF). It was at this point that the resident observed
that "Slim just left town," because it was highly unlikely that Deborah
could survive on SCUF until her abdominal difficulties cleared up
enough to reinstitute CPD. Meanwhile, her respiratory and nutritional
capabilities were declining rapidly. Her parents were consulted and
agreed to make Deborah DNR, meaning simply that no chest compres-
sion would be done if she were to undergo cardiac arrest; all other
treatment measures remained in place. Nine days after the abdominal
surgery, Deborah died.
D. Esther Stephens
Ms. Stephens was a twenty-six-year-old woman who had an aneu-
rysm burst in her brain two weeks after delivering her second child.
After six weeks on the neurological intensive care unit, Ms. Stephens
remained in a coma, unresponsive to her surroundings, incapable of
purposeful movement. She was breathing on her own, but had a fever
that was tentatively diagnosed as a staphylococcal infection. Her hus-
band reported that in the course of their six-year marriage, his wife
had often expressed the wish never to live in less than a fully cognitive
state. In fact, a few years earlier a close friend had suffered a ruptured
aneurysm after giving birth, and throughout the course of the friend's
(Vol. 23:261
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illness and eventual death, Ms. Stephens had repeatedly exhorted her
husband never to let her remain alive in such a condition.
An ethics consultation was suggested by Ms. Black, the nurse who
worked with Ms. Stephens's primary physician, a neurologist named
Dr. Lopez. Ms. Black, Ms. Stephens's social worker, and various other
nurses had unofficially confided to staff ethicists that Dr. Lopez "never
gives up," and never admits to a bleak prognosis. The social worker
was concerned because Mr. Stephens was becoming angry and frus-
trated that his wife was being treated in a way that went against her
expressed wishes. He repeatedly said that Esther would not want to live
if she were to remain in a nursing home.
Mr. Stephens, Ms. Black, the social worker, and three ethicists
were present at the ethics consultation. Dr. Lopez was not there, but
sent a resident in his stead. The resident reiterated Dr. Lopez's posi-
tion: "Until Esther's fever is resolved, it is imperative to continue to
treat aggressively." Mr. Stephens tried to elicit a clearer prognosis, but
to no avail. One ethicist tried to push the resident to consider what
options would be available once the fever resolved, privately thinking
that if Esther's alternatives were death from infection or life in a nurs-
ing home, Mr. Stephens's only chance to carry out her wishes might be
to insist that antibiotics be withdrawn. The resident refused to foreclose
the possibility of a future in which Ms. Stephens returned home a func-
tioning person. The nurse and social worker, who had been vocal in
their concern privately, remained silent.
The meeting ended with Mr. Stephens's expressed acceptance of
continued treatment, based on the open prognosis, and with the under-
standing that there would be another consultation in a few weeks, when
the fever resolved. The second consultation never took place. With the
resolution of her fever, Esther's condition did not improve, but she was
no longer in danger of dying. She was sent to a regular nursing floor,
and at this writing plans are being made to send her to a rehabilitation
facility with a coma stimulation program.
III. Ti-m ELEIMENTS OF PROGNOSIS
The reason power remains with the physician is that all of these
approaches are, and in the nature of things must be, dependent on the
medical prognosis. Very few people have an aversion to a particular
medical intervention in and of itself. Most people will agree to almost
any procedure if there is a good enough chance of a positive outcome.
Depending on particular values and "risk budget," one person may de-
1991]
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cide on surgery if there is even a remote possibility of success while
requiring a much greater chance to undergo the rigors of chemother-
apy. Likewise, people differ markedly in what they consider a "success-
ful outcome" or an acceptable quality of life. But most people are "bal-
ancers"; few are like Jehovah's Witnesses, prepared to say that a
specific medical treatment is always unacceptable in any context.
The wording of the three methods for addressing the problem of
overtreatment discussed in this Article17 all indicate a dependence on
medical prognosis. Thus, the typical living will begins "If there is no
reasonable chance of my recovery ...... A hospital policy statement on
DNR orders entitled, "A Statement of Policy on Care of the Hope-
lessly Ill," explains, "Hopelessly ill patients have an irreversible disease
where death will be the outcome."' 8 Where the patient has executed a
durable power of attorney, the designated agent must make decisions
based on risk/benefit analyses in which the patient's prognosis is proba-
bly the most important factor.
If arriving at a prognosis'9 were a mechanical exercise in which all
the relevant factors were fed into a computer that responded with a
single numerical projection with which everyone agreed, there would
not be a problem. Unfortunately, the ambiguities of prognosis are
myriad.
(1) Each person presents a unique combination of strengths and
weaknesses. An allergy to an important drug may complicate an other-
wise bright prognosis; a strong heart may pull one patient through an
episode of kidney failure that would be fatal to most.
(2) Two physicians, depending on personal experience, knowledge,
and personality, could interpret the same data in two different ways, or
at least with different nuances.
(3) With new forms of therapy, for example organ transplants,
much may depend on the institution. One transplant center may have a
success rate of sixty percent, while another has a rate of seventy per-
cent (but perhaps, the first institution takes riskier cases).
(4) With very new therapies the data base may be extremely
small, or survivors may not yet have lived long enough to give much
information about long-range outcomes. There are, in addition, many
factors related to outcome that we do not understand.
17. See supra notes 3-14 and accompanying text.
18. CLEVELAND CLINIC FOUNDATION PoLCaCs 111-4 (Oct. 1989).
19. Prognosis, literally translated, means "knowledge about the future." OXFORD ENOLISH
DICTIONARY 1437 (1933).
[Vol. 23.261
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In addition to these relatively "objective" problems with prognosis,
there are a number of "subjective" problems as well:
(5) The primary physician is performing a number of different
functions simultaneously. She is (ideally) the patient's ally and sup-
porter, sensitive to the patient's need for hope and reassurance, but she
must also be the hard-headed scientist who can present the diagnosis
and prognosis in an unbiased way. She needs to engender patient confi-
dence in her abilities, but also must admit to doubt. She needs to be
encouraging, but also honest. In their theoretical study of prognosis in
medicine, Hilden and Habbema point out that "there are sometimes
rational or semi-rational grounds for the doctor to withhold some infor-
mation or understate the uncertainty" but that this confficts with the
goal of allowing the patient to assess the merits of each treatment. To
allow the patient to make such an assessment, "the doctor would have
to explain carefully and honestly each action-specific prognosis and ask
the patient to imagine the decisions he would make if that particular
action were taken."20
(6) Physicians tend to be extremely uncomfortable sharing their
uncertainty with patients, so much so that they can deceive themselves
about their own level of certainty. Hilden and Habbema list this prob-
lem as one of the sources of "tension and distrust" between doctors and
patients:
The public tends to think that the medical profession can
make much more precise predictions than is actually the case;
so do, by the way, the doctors themselves. To preserve the im-
age of the profession, and in view of the undesirability of un-
certainty as such .... the clinician may be inclined to under-
state the amount of prognostic uncertainty, and perhaps
sometimes justifiably so. 21
Jay Katz, in his poignantly titled book, The Silent World of Doctor
and Patient,22 asks why principles of medical ethics have never urged
doctors to share decisionmaking with patients. "We need to inquire
why physicians have been so insistent in their demand that all authority
be vested in one party-the doctor."' 23 He finds part of the answer in
20. Hilden & Habbema, Prognosis in Medicine: An Analysis of its Meaning and Roles, 8
THEORETICAL MED. 349, 359 (1987).
21. Id. at 358.
22. 1. KATZ, THE SiLENT WoRLD OF DocTOR AN PATIENT (1984).
23. Id. at xvii.
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physicians' discomfort with uncertainty:
One important reason for this insistence is physicians' un-
familiarity with and embarrassment over conversing with pa-
tients about medical ignorance and uncertainties that can so
decisively affect choice of treatment. This problem has become
more acute during this century, due to physicians' increased
capacities to distinguish knowledge from ignorance and uncer-
tainty. Revelation of such uncertainties is difficult and disqui-
eting. Learning to live more comfortably with uncertainty,
however, has also been impeded by other strongly held, al-
though largely unexamined, professional beliefs, that patients
are unable to tolerate awareness of uncertainty, and that faith
in professionals and their prescriptions makes a significant
contribution to the optimal treatment of disease.2 4
In contrast, philosopher/physician Eric Cassell states that "the
hallmark of physicians is their ability to tolerate uncertainty,"25 and
points out that uncertainty in medicine arises from two "unresolvable"
sources:
The first is that all medical actions are about the future
and the future is ineluctably unknowable. The other funda-
mentally important source of uncertainty is that all systematic
knowledge is generalized to one degree or another and every
decision is about a particular patient. There will always be un-
certainty about the applicability of general knowledge to a pa-
tient-it cannot be otherwise. . . . In medicine as in clinical
ethics a basic tension exists. Withdrawal from the patient is
rewarded with certainty and punished by insufficient knowl-
edge, the move towards the patient is rewarded with knowl-
edge and punished with uncertainties. The fact remains, how-
ever, that to disengage from the patient is to lose the ultimate
source of knowledge in medicine. 26
One argument physicians make for not sharing their uncertainty
with patients is that medical authority has a powerful placebo effect,
what Cassell calls "the healing property of confidence."2 7 This is an
24. Id.
25. E. CASSELL, THE NATURE OF SUFFERING ch. 11 (forthcoming 1991, page numbers not yet
available).
26. Id.
27. Id.
[Vol. 23:261
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important point, because it is clear that there is a placebo effect on
human physiology; in other words, the old assumption that because a
sugar pill worked the condition was "all in the patient's head," is un-
founded. Katz muses:
If physicians themselves are the placebos, then they are
powerful therapeutic agents in their own right. . . . Deep in
patients' unconscious, physicians are viewed as miracle work-
ers, patterned after the fantasied all-caring parents of infancy.
Medicine, after all, was born in magic and religion, and the
doctor-priest-magician-parent unity that persists in patients'
unconscious cannot be broken. The placebo effect therefore at-
tests to the power of the unconscious. Yet, patients are defined
by their consciousness as well. On a conscious level, patients
are aware of the limitations of medicine and physicians. They
have learned of these limitations from personal suffering, from
illnesses and deaths of loved ones. Patients know that miracles
are only occasionally the lot of mankind. They may hope for
miracles, but they are also resigned to the reality of their
rarity.28
Katz acknowledges that "expressions of hope and reassurance" aug-
ment the placebo effect, but he is unwilling to jettison the principles of
truth-telling and patient autonomy. He expresses the hope that ac-
knowledgement of limitations does not necessarily diminish the placebo
effect, because it is possible to admit to uncertainty and still convey a
message of hope and reassurance. Katz hopes that by demonstrating
honesty, physicians will prove their trustworthiness in ways that will
increase the placebo effect, not diminish it. He further argues that de-
ception on the part of the physician inevitably leads to a generalized
lack of communication between doctor and patient, "for the withhold-
ing of crucial information compromisesi intimacy, and physicians and
patients can engage only in arm's-length transactions."20
(7) Even in cases where the medical facts are clear and the prog-
nosis relatively certain, there can be enormous ambiguity about what
the prognosis means. In Katz's book, the doctor who hesitates to per-
form a radical mastectomy on "Iphigenia" is reluctant because she is
"young and attractive."30 Why does he assume that in an older or ug-
28. J. KAT. supra note 22, at 192.
29. Id. at 193.
30. Id. at 90-93.
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lier woman, the radical surgery would be less unwelcome? To the doc-
tor, a diagnosis of diabetes may carry a prognosis that can be expressed
in scientific terms; to the patient, what is paramount may be fears
about sexual functioning and independence. The question, "But will my
spouse still want to make love to me?" is also a request for prognosis,
but one no doctor can answer.31
(8) The way people react to probability is often irrational, as evi-
denced by the number of people who do not bother to use seatbelts, or
teenagers who have unprotected intercourse and are then astonished to
discover that they have become pregnant. An encounter with a single
"living statistic" can often seem much more meaningful than a host of
numbers; candidates for cardiac transplant whom I have interviewed
have usually been more influenced by the one or two healthy survivors
they have spoken with than by the official seventy-percent success rate.
Almost every medical geneticist has a story about a couple who, after
extensive education about the one-in-four risk of having a child with a
particular recessive trait, will then volunteer, "Well, the risks are fifty/
fifty; either the child has the trait or it doesn't." In the recent Pennsyl-
vania lottery people spent thousands of dollars and drove across the
country to buy tickets at odds of 9.6 million to 1.s2
(9) Taking into account just these factors (and there are many
more, for example in cross-cultural contexts) 83 it is apparent that "the
prognosis" presented by the physician is in fact the result of a choice,
conscious or otherwise, to present a certain picture to a certain patient.
The same patient might elicit a very different prognosis from another
doctor. Even the doctor who strives to present the most objective pic-
31. I am indebted to David Barnard for some of these insights.
32. USA Today, Apr. 26, 1989, at IA.
33. Notions of etiology and cure of disease (and even of what constitutes a disease) vary
widely across cultures. In many ethnic groups in North America, beliefs about illness and healing
can be very different from those of mainstream medicine. When health care personnel are not
aware of these differences, they "may be unable to respond appropriately to the personal needs of
patients for information, reassurance, and effective treatment." Harwood, Introduction to ETrINic-
ITY AND MEDICAL CARE 1 (A. Harwood ed. 1981). Different concepts of disease affect evaluation
of symptoms, utilization of "alternative" practitioners and "folk" remedies, and compliance with
mainstream treatment regimens. Id. at 9. Among the Navajo, for example, modern medicine is
used as a way to alleviate symptoms. To actually cure the disease, the patient turns to the tradi-
tional healing ceremonies. Thus, "Anglo" treatments that give quick relief, such as stitching
wounds or setting bones, are easily accepted, but diagnostic procedures and surgery are often
resisted. Kunitz & Levy, Navajos, in ETHNICITY AND MEDICAL CARE, supra pp. 337, 382.
In many developing countries, moreover, the germ theory of disease is not accepted, "particu-
larly among the not-so-educated members of the population." Ekunwe & Kessell, Informed Con-
sent in the Developing World, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1984, at 22, 23.
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ture possible, allowing the patient to fill in the subjective shadings him-
self, is forced to use words like "pain" and "fatigue," which resist
quantification. Furthermore, doctors differ radically in such character-
istics as pessimism and optimism, risk aversion, and sensitivity to pain.
Therefore, a patient (or a patient's agent) who is trying to decide
whether the time has come to deescalate therapy, ask for a DNR order,
or try an experimental treatment, is so dependent on the doctor's sub-
jective presentation of the prognosis, that a decision that appears to be
the patient's is in reality dictated almost totally by the doctor's
presentation.
IV. How PROGNOSIS AFFECTS PATIENTS' DECISIONS
It is possible to shuffle the small deck of cases discussed above in a
number of ways. In two cases, the goal of a "dignified death" was
achieved. In all cases, the appropriate decisionmakers were identified
and their wishes followed. It is notable that two of the cases involved
an ethics committee or its consult team. The language of the note in
Mr. Cooper's chart, referring to the "principle of autonomy," shows the
sophistication of the physician about ethical concepts. 35 In short, these
decisions appear to be made in an environment where there is a high
level of awareness of biomedical ethics, and in which informed consent
is a reality.
But if we shift our angle of perspective, it becomes clear that every
one of these cases was decided by one person: the primary physician.
Patients or their surrogates appear to be making the decisions, sur-
rounded by the impressive trappings of ethics committees and the like,
but in fact they are making the decisions that the physician directs by
the manner in which she conveys the prognosis. As long as Dr. Lopez
refuses to "give up hope" for Esther Stephens, her husband will be
effectively blocked from carrying out her wishes by demanding an end
to treatment.36 The process looks respectful of the Stephens's rights,
but only because a face-off has been sidestepped.
Mr. Cooper's wishes, as relayed by his wife, were respected be-
cause the physician had decided that the prognosis was so poor that
survival was extremely unlikely.37 It is true that had Mrs. Cooper con-
34. At least, Mr. Stephens never expressed a distinct request that was refused. See supra Part
II(D).
35. See supra Part II(A).
36. See supra Part II (D).
37. See supra Part II(A).
1991]
HeinOnline  -- 23 Conn. L. Rev. 275 1990-1991
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
veyed her husband's wishes for more aggressive treatment, the physi-
cian would have complied (up to a point). Likewise, had Nikki's par-
ents wished, he would have been given full respiratory and nutritional
support until his death (Nikki's doctor remarked privately later that
that is what he would have done had Nikki been his child).38 The par-
ents were allowed to make the choice because the doctor had deter-
mined that Nikki's prognosis was dismal. What if the pediatric neurol-
ogist had been a more "optimistic" personality, more like Dr. Lopez?
What if he had thought to himself, I am only ninety-five percent cer-
tain that Nikki has myoclonic encephalopathy, and if he does have
some other disease there is always the outside chance that he will sur-
vive, so he had told the parents that "there is always hope, we mustn't
give up"?
The clearest example of the overwhelming power of the primary
physician is in the case of Deborah Cook."9 At every juncture, treat-
ment was justified verbally by the fact that the parents wanted to "go
for it." When I spoke with the primary physician, I asked him if he
had shared with the Cooks the fact that his optimism was definitely a
minority opinion. He had not done so. The nurses and doctors on the
ICU had also not expressed their discomfort to the Cooks, although
they saw them almost daily. When I asked why, I was told that it was
wrong to give the family "mixed messages." To this observer, it was
clear that Deborah and her parents were on an express train driven by
the primary physician alone.
In today's sophisticated ethical climate, it is no longer acceptable
to justify end-of-life choices because the doctor made them and "doctor
knows best." Today we want to know that the person's own values have
been respected; if the patient is incapable of making those values
known, we want to know that an appropriate surrogate has spoken for
him. The nephrologist's statement to the parents that a decision not to
treat would be respected, shows a sensitivity to the current climate. But
by telling them only his optimistic prognosis, and not telling them of
his colleagues' concerns, he made the decision for them as surely as if
he had brushed them aside in the first place.
Looking at these cases further, it is clear that neither advance di-
rectives nor durable powers of attorney would have changed the course
of events, even in the two cases involving adults. In the case of Esther
38. See supra Part II(B).
39. See supra Part II(C).
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Stephens, her explicit statements to her husband were as clear as a
written advance directive; imagine further that the Stephenses had
taken the precaution of executing a durable power of attorney for Es-
ther, with her husband as attorney-in-fact. And posit as well that the
state in which this took place had passed legislation giving legal status
to advance directives and durable powers of attorney for health care.
Would Ms. Stephens's case have turned out any differently? No. Mr.
Stephens, trying to fulfill his responsibilities to his wife, would have
pressed to discontinue treatment if there were no reasonable chance of
recovery. Dr. Lopez would have continued to hold out hope that recov-
ery was possible, thereby sidestepping an open confrontation. The am-
biguity of the word "recovery" in this context would have contributed
to Mr. Stephens's frustration, as Dr. Lopez would have refused to be
pinned down to an explicit description of what Esther's capabilities
were likely to be. The nurses, social workers, and residents would have
continued to remain quiet. The result would have been the same: Ms.
Stephens would have spent the rest of her life in a nursing home, the
one fate that she had so clearly wished to avoid.
The role of the hospital DNR policy in these cases is actually quite
small. The policy is enabling, in that it allows the physician to remove
the option of CPR from a patient if the physician chooses. But the
existence of a DNR policy does nothing to change the basic dynamics
of the physician/patient relationship; it merely allows the physician,
once she has decided that the medical prognosis warrants it, to remove
an inhumane and useless treatment.
Advance directives, durable powers of attorney for health care,
and DNR policies are helpful in cases where families and physicians
agree that further treatment is only prolonging the dying process.
These procedures can help all parties feel more comfortable with their
actions when the case for withdrawal of treatment is clear. The ad-
vance directive can reassure the family later, when doubts may set in,
that they were acting as the patient wanted and not out of selfish rea-
sons (e.g., to "get it over" or to avoid expense). A durable power of
attorney can help resolve some conflicts among family members, and
reassure the doctor that the person who is speaking for the patient is
the appropriate one to do so. A DNR policy reassures hospital staff
that their actions are "normal" and "reasonable." These are important
gains.
Where the doctor is "aggressive" and "optimistic," however, all
the legal strategies discussed here become merely window dressing. The
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doctor will give up when he or she is ready to give up, and only at that
point will the patient or family have any real say. But this truth is
hidden by the cosmetic effect of ethics committees, living wills, durable
powers of attorney, and DNRs.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) Because the physician retains almost complete control, we
must concentrate on physician education, including helping physicians
to be more comfortable sharing uncertainty with patients.
(2) In other consumer areas we educate ourselves gradually, so
that we are relatively experienced when we have to cope with big deci-
sions. For example, we work up to the rigors of choosing and financing
a home by making increasingly more important purchases over the
course of years, beginning with our grade-school pocket money. If
health care professionals took the trouble to invite patients into the
decisionmaking process during routine medical events (and if clients
insisted on doing so) this practice might pay off when big decisions
need to be made.40 Clients would learn that even routine decisions are
based on probabilities, and that there are hidden value choices in rou-
tine care that they may wish to consider explicitly.
(3) We must challenge the convention that only one perspective on
prognosis is to be shared with the family. Granted, a family in stress
does not need a dozen people pulling it in a dozen directions, but
neither are people so fragile that they must always be shielded from
controversy. In other areas of life, people can cope with uncertainty.
Why not expand the "team approach" to prognosis, where a range of
perspectives is shared with the patient and family?
(4) Hospital ethicists must encourage other health care providers
(nurses, technicians, residents) to speak up, especially when there is
near-consensus among them that the primary physician is being unreal-
istic. Ethicists can be heartened in this endeavor by the new mood of
professionalism and autonomy in the nursing profession. Although
working behind the scenes to encourage and empower others is proba-
bly best, there will be times when the ethics consult team or hospital
ethicist must openly challenge the perspective of the primary physician
and insist that the family be exposed to other views. Since Ms.
Stephens and Baby Deborah were real patients, it is impossible to pre-
40. To some extent, we see this in women's health care, as women have insisted on educating
themselves and on expanding the choices in areas like childbirth and breast cancer. See Annas,
Breast.Cancer: The Treatment of Choice, 10 HAsTINGs CErrER REP., April 1980, at 27-29.
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dict with certainty what would have happened had the ethicists been
able to do this, but it appears likely that the outcomes would have been
better. Families would have acted in a more "informed" manner, and
needless suffering might have been avoided. The legal maxim that a
person has the right to decide what happens to his or her body would
have been more clearly honored. If the ethicist does not bring a conflict
over prognosis into the open when she knows it exists, then she becomes
merely another passenger on the doctor-driven express train, one of the
amenities offered by the hospital, but one which makes no real differ-
ence in the end.
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